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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a female medical patient in need of reproductive health services. 
As a Medicaid recipient, she hopes to use Medicaid funding to help alleviate her 
out-of-pocket costs for health services from Planned Parenthood.1 In most 
states, this female patient would have no trouble using her Medicaid funds to 
help pay for her visit to Planned Parenthood.  
                                                                                                                     
  J.D. Candidate, May 2019, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. 
 1 According to Planned Parenthood, it is not uncommon for its patients to use 
government funding for its services, as at least 60% of Planned Parenthood patients rely on 
public health programs like Medicaid or Title X for their preventative and primary care. 
Miriam Berg, How Federal Funding Works at Planned Parenthood, PLANNED PARENTHOOD 
(Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/blog/how-federal-funding-works-
at-planned-parenthood [https://perma.cc/9MKK-ASD2].  
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A female patient in this same health situation, however, may not be able to 
use Medicaid funds for services she receives at Planned Parenthood if she is a 
resident of a state bound by the Eighth Circuit,2 as the Eighth Circuit concluded 
in August 2017.3  
For decades, health care issues have been a source of partisan conflict.4 The 
contentious political environment and staunch partisanship of the past few years, 
however, have brought fundamental questions about the American health care 
system to the front of the political fray.5 Specifically, what coverage can citizens 
receive while using funding from the government? Is there a fundamental right 
to this coverage? If so, when does a state go too far in exercising its deference 
                                                                                                                     
 2 A woman in this situation may not be denied from obtaining services just at Planned 
Parenthood, but also from any provider that a state decertifies as “qualified,” regardless of 
the types of medical services she is trying to receive. See Does v. Gillespie, 867 F.3d 1034, 
1046–47 (8th Cir. 2017) (Shepherd, CJ., concurring) (“[T]he right provided is to a range of 
qualified providers . . . there exists no right to a particular provider the State has 
decertified.”). 
 3 Does, 867 F.3d at 1046. 
 4 See e.g., Howard Markel, 69 Years Ago, a President Pitches His Idea for National  
Health Care, P.B.S. NEWS HOUR (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/ 
november-19-1945-harry-truman-calls-national-health-insurance-program [http://perma.cc/ 
CK6R-5XS8] (explaining how Truman’s plan of having every earning American pay 
monthly fees or taxes to cover the cost of medical expenses was condemned by the American 
Medical Association because it was too closely associated with “socialized medicine” and 
“Communism”); John Dickerson, Kennedycare: Fifty Years Before Obamacare, JFK Had 
His Own Health Care Debacle, SLATE (Nov. 17, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_ 
and_politics/history/2013/11/john_f_kennedy_s_health_care_failure_jfk_and_barack_oba
ma_s_tough_fights.html [http://perma.cc/WTL9-6L6X] (outlining how Kennedy’s plan to 
provide health care for elderly Americans was a “flop” because it was viewed as an attempt 
to “socialize medicine” and “threat[en] individual liberty”); KANT PATEL & MARK 
RUSHEFSKY, HEALTH CARE POLITICS AND POLICY IN AMERICA 47–48 (3d ed. 2006) 
(explaining how Nixon struggled with plans to revamp health care to alleviate rising costs 
with a Democratic Congress).  
 5 See, e.g., Reed Abelson, Health Care Issues Loom in Politics, Payments and Quality, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/business/dealbook/ 
health-care-issues-loom-in-politics-payments-and-quality.html [http://perma.cc/KL7Z-
25Y9] (discussing the potential for the Affordable Care Act to be repealed in the wake of 
Donald Trump being elected as president);Wide Partisan Gap in Opinions About Legalizing 
Marijuana Use, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan 5, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/ 
10/08/americans-support-marijuana-legalization/ft_18-01-05_marijuana_table_update/ 
[https://perma.cc/V9XW-ELSR]; David Mitchell, A Patient’s Optimistic Call for Bipartisan  
Drug-Pricing Reform, FORBES (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017 
/03/27/a-patients-optimistic-call-for-bipartisan-drug-pricing-reform/#18de7938472c 
[http://perma.cc/624E-9M8K] (imploring politicians to find a way to work across the aisle 
to address exorbitant drug prices affecting the health and economic decisions of many 
Americans); Views of 2010 Health Care Law Remain Highly Partisan, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 
11, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/12/11/for-the-first-time-more- 
americans-say-2010-health-care-law-has-had-a-positive-than-negative-impact-on-u-s/ft_17 
-12-08_aca_highly-partisan/ [https://perma.cc/A3LP-5UE3] (finding that seven years after 
its passage, the ACA was supported by 85% of Democrats and only 14% of Republicans). 
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in determining what provider meets its definition of ‘qualified’ within the 
meaning of the Medicaid Act? Did Congress intend to create a judicially 
enforceable right for individual patients to choose any qualified provider that 
offers the services they seek?  
In light of these questions, this Note examines whether Medicaid 
beneficiaries have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when a state 
declines to provide Medicaid funding to certain medical providers.6 Part II 
analyzes the purposes of the Medicaid Act, particularly the free choice of 
provider provision. This Note concludes that under the Act, individual states 
may not decline Medicaid funds to providers meeting the Act’s “qualified 
provider” standard. With this in mind, Part III emphasizes that a provider does 
not have a claim against a state that denies the use of Medicaid funds for its 
services. This effectively makes a Medicaid beneficiary’s ability to sue the only 
possible source of relief if a state wrongly determines that a provider is not 
“qualified” within the meaning of the Medicaid Act. Part IV explores negative 
outcomes of the Eighth Circuit’s decision, particularly if it is adopted by other 
state and federal jurisdictions. Part V analyzes the Supreme Court’s approach to 
determine whether a statute confers an enforceable federal right under Section 
1983 and concludes that Medicaid beneficiaries should have a fundamental right 
to sue state governments for denying Medicaid funds to qualified providers.  
II. OVERVIEW OF THE MEDICAID ACT 
In 1965, the Medicaid Act was signed into law as Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act to provide health coverage to low-income Americans.7 From the 
time it was enacted up to the present, the Medicaid Act has empowered the 
federal government to provide each individual state with its own Medicaid 
funding.8 Each state in turn administers its Medicaid program differently based 
on the needs of each individual state.9 
                                                                                                                     
 6 Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) to provide individuals with an avenue to 
defend individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution when such right is infringed by a 
state actor under color of law. The applicable language states: “Every person who, under 
color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, 
or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .” § 1983. To obtain relief under Section 1983, a 
plaintiff must “prove a violation of one of [his or her] constitutional rights or the violation 
of a right guaranteed under federal law” and that the actions giving rise to the suit were 
“taken or directly controlled by someone acting under color of state law.” Paul Clabo, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, 9 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 65–66 (1977). For greater detail regarding 
how this potential relief applies to the usage of Medicaid funding, see infra Part III.V. 
 7 Program History, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/about-us/program-
history/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q2QJ-64KE] 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id.; See, e.g., State Overviews, MEDICAID.GOV,  
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When Congress passed the Medicaid Act, its main goal for the legislation 
was to “provid[e] hospital, post-hospital extended care, and home health 
coverage to almost all Americans aged 65 or older.”10 In other words, the 
primary purpose of Medicaid and Medicare was to supplement health care 
coverage for retired individuals receiving Social Security benefits. This was 
particularly important given that at the time the Medicaid Act was enacted, 
“seniors were the population group most likely to be living in poverty.”11 At the 
same time, as life expectancy rates increased in the United States,12 the 
Medicaid Act was Congress’ way of addressing the issue of medical costs 
“rising sharply.”13 Congress passed the Medicaid Act with retired Americans in 
mind, but states also have the option to provide funding to other groups of 
Americans, including low-income children and their caregivers, the blind, and 
other individuals with disabilities.14 
In 1967, just two years after the Medicaid Act was passed, Congress 
amended the Act to include a “freedom of choice provision,” or freedom of 
provider provision, in the statute.15 The purpose of this addition to the Act was 
to address states “relying exclusively on publicly operated health systems to 
furnish care.”16 In other words, Congress wished to avoid states directing 
Medicaid beneficiaries only to publicly operated health care providers for 
healthcare services. Additionally, statements from representatives in the House 
suggest that Congress also intended to prevent the federal government from 
imposing “moral judgments” on Americans in their decisions regarding family 
planning.17  
                                                                                                                     
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/by-state/by-state.html [https://perma.cc/Q43X-C72H] 
(analyzing Medicaid programs in each state, including factors such as eligibility 
requirements, applications, and how many children participate in each state’s program). 
 10 Medicare & Medicaid Milestones: 1937-2015, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS. 1, 2 (July 2015), https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/History/ 
Downloads/Medicare-and-Medicaid-Milestones-1937-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/P33A- 
8MFL].  
 11 Id.  
 12 Table 22. Life Expectancy at Birth, at 65 Years of Age, and at 75 Years of Age by 
Race and Sex: United States, Selected Years 1900-2007, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ 
data/hus/2010/022.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XTH-82P8]. 
 13 Judith D. Moore & David G. Smith, Legislating Medicaid: Considering Medicaid 
and Its Origins, 27 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 45, 47 (2005–2006). 
 14 Medicare & Medicaid Milestones: 1937-2015, supra note 10, at 2. 
 15 Sara Rosenbaum, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Healthcare: Issues in the Design, 
Structure, and Administration of Federal Healthcare Financing Programs Supported 
Through Direct Public Funding, in, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND 
ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE 676 (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003).  
 16 Id.  
 17 90 CONG. REC. 10701 (1967) (“The objectives of the departmental policy are to 
improve the health of the people, to strengthen the integrity of the family, and to provide 
families the freedom of choice to determine the spacing of their children and the size of their 
families.”).  
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The language of the provision provides that “any individual eligible for 
medical assistance (including drugs) may obtain such assistance from any 
institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the 
service or services required.”18 Therefore, the freedom of provider provision 
affords a Medicaid recipient the ability to use Medicaid funds to pay for medical 
services from any provider he or she chooses, as long as the provider meets 
certain standards and is “qualified” within the Act.19  
Because the freedom of provider provision offers Medicaid freedom of 
choice only with respect to providers that are deemed “qualified,” it is 
imperative to understand what the definition of “qualified” is in the context of 
providers covered by Medicaid. The language of the provision states that 
Medicaid beneficiaries may obtain medical services “from any institution, 
agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service or 
services required . . . who undertakes to provide [a beneficiary] such 
services.”20 Thus, any medical provider that meets this definition is available as 
an option for Medicaid beneficiaries wishing to use their Medicaid funds for 
healthcare services.  
Surprisingly,21 Congress did not and has not defined what “qualified” 
means within the Medicaid Act.22 Rather, each individual state is afforded 
deference in determining what the definition of “qualified” is, usually based on 
the state’s medical boards and licensing requirements.23 This can be 
problematic, especially considering that Congress’ purpose in adding the 
freedom of choice provision was based on some states’ decisions to prohibit 
Medicaid recipients from using Medicaid funds at private healthcare facilities.24  
Determining which providers are “qualified” is at the crux of the inquiry of 
whether a certain provider, and therefore a beneficiary’s choice to use Medicaid 
funding, is covered and protected by the Medicaid Act. However, Congress is 
mysteriously silent and does not explicitly define “qualified provider.” This 
raises the question of what recourse (if any) a beneficiary may have when her 
state of residence rejects her ability to use Medicaid funding on the grounds that 
her provider of choice isn’t “qualified.”  
                                                                                                                     
 18 The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(23) (2012). 
 19 42 C.F.R. § 431.51(a)(1) (“Section 1902(a)(23) of the Act provides that beneficiaries 
may obtain services from any qualified Medicaid provider that undertakes to provide the 
services to them.”). 
 20 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(23).  
 21 Or not surprisingly, depending on one’s faith in Congress’ drafting skills. 
 22 Medicaid Toolkit: Qualified Provider, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING ASS’N, 
https://www.asha.org/Practice/reimbursement/medicaid/Medicaid-Toolkit-Qualified-
Provider/ [https://perma.cc/6FEY-6XGX]. 
 23 Id.  
 24 Rosenbaum, supra note 15, at 676.  
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III. MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES’ RIGHT TO SUE INDIVIDUAL STATES 
The language of the free choice of provider provision is vague and 
ambiguous, particularly regarding the definition of what makes a health care 
provider “qualified” within the meaning of the statute.25 This ambiguity leaves 
courts with the task of determining whether a statute is intended to benefit an 
individual and provide that individual with a judicially enforceable right under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
A. The Eighth Circuit’s Interpretation of the Free Choice of Provider 
Provision 
In August 2017, the Eighth Circuit issued a decision in Does v. Gillespie in 
which it ruled against Planned Parenthood of Arkansas, Planned Parenthood of 
Eastern Oklahoma, and three female Planned Parenthood patients, validating the 
state of Arkansas’ decision to block Medicaid beneficiaries from using 
Medicaid funds for health services from Planned Parenthood.26 The three female 
Medicaid beneficiaries sued the state of Arkansas after the governor terminated 
the state’s Medicaid provider agreements with Planned Parenthood as a result 
of the release of a controversial video allegedly showing local Planned 
Parenthood employees discussing fetal tissue sales.27  
In issuing its decision, the Eighth Circuit vacated injunctions and a 
temporary restraining order (TRO) that the District Court put in place to protect 
the three Medicaid beneficiaries and prevent the state of Arkansas from 
withholding Medicaid funds to pay for the women’s services because they were 
performed at Planned Parenthood.28 As part of its reasoning, the Eighth Circuit 
                                                                                                                     
 25 See supra Part II. 
 26 Does v. Gillespie, 867 F.3d 1034, 1046 (8th Cir. 2017); Merrit Kennedy, Federal 
Appeals Court Says Arkansas Can Block Medicaid Payments to Planned Parenthood, NPR 
(Aug. 16, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/16/543974021/federal- 
appeals-court-says-arkansas-can-block-medicaid-payments-to-planned-paren 
[https://perma.cc/KQ7Y-4B8Y]; Jessie Hellmann, Arkansas Cuts Off Medicaid Funds to 
Planned Parenthood Following Court Ruling, THE HILL (Nov. 28, 2017), 
http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/362120-arkansas-cuts-off-medicaid-funds-to-planned-
parenthood-following-court [https://perma.cc/2U3Q-2WK7]. 
 27 See Does, 867 F.3d at 1038; Danielle Kurtzleben, Planned Parenthood Investigations 
Find No Fetal Tissue Sales, NPR (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/01/28/4645948 
26/in-wake-of-videos-planned-parenthood-investigations-find-no-fetal-tissue-sales 
[https://perma.cc/59CT-8QBM]. This video was investigated by Planned Parenthood, which 
concluded that it was falsified and the allegations regarding fetal tissue sales were false. 
Kurtzleben, supra note 27.  
 28 Planned Parenthood Ark. & E. Okla. v. Gillespie, No. 4:15-cv-00566-KGB, 2016 
WL 8928315, at *7 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 29, 2016) (issuing a preliminary injunction order on 
behalf of the patient class); Planned Parenthood Ark. & E. Okla. v. Selig, No. 4:15-cv-00566-
KGB, 2015 WL 13307030, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 18, 2015) (issuing a TRO and a preliminary 
injunction).  
2019] USING MEDICAID FUNDS FOR PLANNED PARENTHOOD 139 
held that a Medicaid beneficiary’s free choice of provider is not a judicially 
enforceable right that is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, meaning that the 
three women had no cause of action and no right to sue the state of Arkansas for 
its decision regarding Planned Parenthood.29  
The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the free choice of provider provision does 
not provide beneficiaries with an actionable right against states for a variety of 
reasons. First, because the Medicaid Act is a spending statute, it is not enough 
to establish that Congress intended to create an enforceable federal right; rather, 
“nothing ‘short of an unambiguously conferred right’ will support a cause of 
action under § 1983.”30 Second, the Eighth Circuit interprets the freedom of 
choice provision as a directive to a federal agency, not as conferring a right to 
individual beneficiaries that is judicially-enforceable.31  
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit determined that Congress had already 
provided another way to enforce state compliance with the free choice of 
provider provision: if states fail to provide funding to qualified providers, the 
Secretary of Health may withhold federal funding for Medicaid under 42 U.S.C. 
1396(c).32 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit determined that because the free choice 
of provider provision is part of a “compliance regime,” it is a statute with an 
“aggregate focus,” and therefore does not confer any rights to individuals.33 For 
these reasons, the Eighth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs could not use 
Section 1983 to compel the state government to provide Medicaid funding for 
their care at Planned Parenthood.34 
In the wake of this surprising decision from the Eighth Circuit, many 
questions remain unanswered. Many Americans may wonder what motivated 
the Eighth Circuit to deviate from the reasoning of the District Court and other 
Circuits that have addressed the issue, and whether the Gillespie decision is here 
to stay. And if so, what kind of relief will be available for Medicaid beneficiaries 
who are disallowed from using Medicaid funding for health care services that 
they would likely be unable to afford otherwise? 
                                                                                                                     
 29 Does, 867 F.3d at 1046 (“Given our conclusion that § 23(A) of the Medicaid Act 
does not give the Jane Does or the class of Medicaid beneficiaries an enforceable federal 
right that supports a cause of action under § 1983, the plaintiffs do not have a likelihood of 
success on the merits of their claims.”). 
 30 Id. at 1040 (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002)).  
 31 See The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(23) (“Any individual eligible for 
medical assistance . . . such assistance from any institution, agency community pharmacy, 
or person, qualified to perform the service or services required.”); Does, 867 F.3d at 1041.  
 32 Does, 867 F.3d at 1041. 42 U.S.C. 1396(c) provides that the Secretary of Health may 
withhold funding to the state agency supervising the administration of the state’s Medicaid 
plan if “in the administration of the plan there is a failure to comply substantially.” 
 33 Does, 867 F.3d at 1042.  
 34 Id. at 1046.  
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B. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits’ Interpretation of the 
Free Choice of Provider Provision 
Prior to the Eighth Circuit’s decision, each of the other Circuits that had 
decided the issue unanimously concluded that Medicaid beneficiaries do have a 
right to sue an individual state when the state disallows using Medicaid funding 
for Planned Parenthood.35 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit stands alone on one side 
of the debate, while four other Circuits (the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits) stand on the opposite side.  
For example, the Ninth Circuit has identified two criteria that Medicaid 
beneficiaries must meet in order to be free to choose any provider under the free 
choice of provider provision: “(1) the provider is ‘qualified to perform the 
service or services required,’ and (2) the provider ‘undertakes to provide [the 
recipient] such services.’”36 The Ninth Circuit stated that, although a state 
initially determines whether or not a provider is “qualified,” “[a] court can 
readily determine whether a particular health care provider is qualified to 
perform a particular medical service.”37 To make this determination, the court 
suggested relying upon “evidence such as descriptions of the service required; 
state licensing requirements; the provider's credentials, licenses, and 
experience; and expert testimony regarding the appropriate credentials for 
providing the service.”38 In Planned Parenthood Arizona, Inc. v. Betlach, 
therefore, the Ninth Circuit determined that Planned Parenthood is a qualified 
provider and that Medicaid beneficiaries have an enforceable right if a state 
denies the ability to use Medicaid funds to pay for services at Planned 
Parenthood.39 This right is also recognized in the dissent in Does v. Gillespie.40 
The Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit and 
added the idea that the free choice of provider provision “confers on [Medicaid 
beneficiaries] an individual entitlement—the right to receive reimbursable 
                                                                                                                     
 35 See Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 862 F.3d 445, 457 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(“Joining every other circuit that has addressed this issue, we conclude 
that § 1396a(a)(23) affords the Individual Plaintiffs a private right of action under § 1983.”); 
Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The statutory 
language unambiguously confers [an individual] right upon Medicaid-eligible patients, 
mandating that all state Medicaid plans provide that ‘any individual eligible for medical 
assistance . . . may obtain such assistance from any institution, agency, community 
pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service or services required.’”); Harris v. 
Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the free choice of provider 
provision provides a private right of action enforceable under § 1983).  
 36 Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc., 727 F.3d at 967 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396(23)(A)). 
 37 Id. at 967–68. 
 38 Id. at 968.  
 39 Id.  
 40 Does, 867 F.3d 1034, 1053 (Melloy, CJ., dissenting) (“The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits all applied the Blessing/ Gonzaga framework to hold that the freedom-of-
choice provision creates a private right enforceable under § 1983 . . . I therefore read those 
circuits’ opinions as persuasive authority . . . .”).  
2019] USING MEDICAID FUNDS FOR PLANNED PARENTHOOD 141 
medical services from any qualified provider.”41 Thus, the Fifth, Sixth,42 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits are all in agreement that the free choice of provider 
provision should provide Medicaid beneficiaries with a judicially enforceable 
right to sue a state that denies them the right to use Medicaid funds for services 
from a qualified provider like Planned Parenthood, as for a state to do so would 
contradict the legislative purpose of the Medicaid Act.  
C. Providers May Not Be Able to Sue 
States are generally given broad discretion under the Medicaid Act to 
determine whether a provider is qualified within the meaning of the statute to 
receive Medicaid funding.43 Suppose for a moment that instead of a Medicaid 
beneficiary suing the state for her inability to use Medicaid funding for 
healthcare, her health care provider chooses to sue the state in order to obtain 
Medicaid funds for the health care services rendered.  
In this situation, District Courts have determined that providers have no 
cause of action and no right to demand a state to treat it as a qualified provider 
under the Medicaid Act.44 This is because these courts have concluded that 
whether or not Medicaid funding may be used to pay a specific provider is not 
an issue of a provider’s right.45 It is important to note, however, that a provider 
does have the right to sue if it can prove it is a qualified provider under the Act.46 
But because states alone decide which providers are qualified, it is seemingly 
impossible for a provider to prove that it is qualified when the state has already 
determined that it is not. 
Courts have uniformly held that health care providers do not have the right 
to enforce the free choice of provider provision of the Medicaid Act. If providers 
do not have this right, it must be the beneficiary’s right that is put at risk. If both 
                                                                                                                     
 41 Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of the Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 699 
F.3d 962, 974 (7th Cir. 2012).  
 42 For an example of another case in which the Sixth Circuit found that the free choice 
of provider provision confers a judicially enforceable right under Section 1983, see Westside 
Mothers v. Haveman, 289 F.3d 852 (6th Cir. 2002) and infra Part V.B.  
 43 See AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING ASS’N, supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
 44 See, e.g., Queer v. Westmoreland Cty., No. 2:06-cv-325, 2007 WL 2407283, at *8 
(W.D. Penn. Aug. 20, 2007) (“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must 
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral 
expectation of it. He must, instead have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”) (citing Bd. 
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). 
 45 Q & A: Case on Provider Enforcement of Medicaid Freedom of Choice, NAT’L 
HEALTH L. PROGRAM (Aug. 1, 2007), http://www.healthlaw.org/issues/reproductive-health 
/qa-case-on-provider-enforcement-of-medicaid-freedom-of-choice#.WePcgBNSygQ 
[https://perma.cc/M59M-7HBW]. 
 46 Thomas Quarles, Jr., Devine Health Update: New Hampshire Supreme Court 
Upholds Medicaid Free Choice of Provider Rights, DEVINE MILLIMET (Aug. 21, 2014), 
https://www.devinemillimet.com/uploads/docs/enews/Healthcare/08-21-14/court-upholds-
medicaid-free-choice-of-provider-rights.html [https://perma.cc/7Y6E-L796]. 
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health care providers and beneficiaries are unable sue a state to enforce the free 
choice of provider provision, the question becomes what kind of relief is 
available? If the answer is none, does that answer comport with what Congress 
intended when it added the free choice of provider provision to the Medicaid 
Act in 1967?47  
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOES V. GILLESPIE DECISION 
By concluding that Medicaid beneficiaries do not have a judicially 
enforceable right arising from the free choice of provider provision, the Does v. 
Gillespie court has changed the rights available to plaintiffs in the Eighth 
Circuit.48 Although Does v. Gillespie was decided relatively recently, it has 
already had an impact on subsequent cases decided within the Eighth Circuit.49 
There is no indication that future Eighth Circuit cases will be decided 
differently. Does v. Gillespie has denied plaintiffs the chance to challenge a 
state’s decision denying access to particular health care providers.50 It is a 
decision that will have adverse and disparate effects on the health of Medicaid 
beneficiaries.  
This outcome could have stark political consequences nationwide; other 
federal courts could apply this reasoning to the free choice of provider provision 
and other similar statutes, denying plaintiffs the ability to challenge state action 
in multiple contexts. The reasoning of Does v. Gillespie may encourage other 
states to use their ability to decertify disfavored health care providers as a 
political vehicle to promote a pro-federalism or pro-life agenda to the detriment 
of Medicaid beneficiaries.  
A. Long-Term Effects of the Eighth Circuit Decision Stands 
The Eighth Circuit’s decision clouds the future of Medicaid beneficiaries 
and, more specifically, Medicaid beneficiaries using federal funds for services 
at Planned Parenthood. For female Medicaid beneficiaries in this situation, Does 
v. Gillespie poses several troubling outcomes. Although there is some debate 
about what percentage of Planned Parenthood’s services are abortion 
procedures,51 the majority of what the organization does consists of providing 
                                                                                                                     
 47 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
 48  Does v. Gillespie, 867 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 49 Id. See, e.g., M.B. v. Corsi, No. 2:17-cv-04102-NKL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3232, 
at *46 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2018) (“[N]othing short of an unambiguously conferred right will 
support a cause of action under § 1983.”); Osher v. City of St. Louis, 903 F.3d 698, 702 (8th 
Cir. 2018) (“It is now clear that the proper focus is on congressional intent, and ‘nothing 
short of an unambiguously conferred right’ will support an implied right of action.”) (quoting 
Does, 867 F.3d at 1040 (internal citations omitted)).  
 50 Does, 867 F.3d at 1047. 
 51 See infra note 57. 
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sexual education and general health exams, including breast exams, pap tests, 
and exams to check for sexually-transmitted diseases.52  
If states are allowed more discretion and freedom to withhold Medicaid 
funding from being used for services at Planned Parenthood and beneficiaries 
have no cause of action against them, this could make it much more difficult for 
Planned Parenthood and similar organizations to provide these important 
services to Medicaid beneficiaries. Instead, beneficiaries may choose to forego 
such services without alternative means to afford them.  
Although Planned Parenthood also provides health care services to men, 
withholding Medicaid funding from Planned Parenthood would have a disparate 
impact on female Medicaid beneficiaries, who would lose access to Planned 
Parenthood as a family planning provider.53 Shutting off that access would raise 
Medicaid costs on a greater number of unwanted pregnancies in the states that 
choose to withhold Medicaid funding from Planned Parenthood.54 Ultimately, 
decreasing a Medicaid beneficiary’s ability to use funding at a provider of her 
choice places her at the mercy of the state in which she lives and could result in 
fewer safe, affordable health care options. This situation is exactly what 
Congress intended to avoid when it added the free choice of provider provision 
to the Medicaid Act.55 
Another potential result of Does v. Gillespie is that courts may determine 
that other laws do not confer a judicially enforceable right under Section 1983, 
raising similar concerns of whether such a conclusion is consistent with 
Congressional intent. In fact, this situation has already occurred in the Eighth 
Circuit, where a District Court relied on the Gillespie decision to determine that 
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act does not confer an individual 
cause of action.56 This result could change how courts interpret any statute in 
                                                                                                                     
 52 2016-2017 ANNUAL REPORT, PLANNED PARENTHOOD 1, 29, 
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/uploads/filer_public/71/53/7153464c-8f5d-4a26-bead-
2a0dfe2b32ec/20171229_ar16-17_p01_lowres.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5N4-FC4N] (stating 
that only 3% of Planned Parenthood services in 2016 and 2017 were abortions); see also 
Debra Goldschmidt & Ashley Strickland, Planned Parenthood: Fast Facts and Revealing 
Numbers, CNN (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2015/08/04/health/planned-parent 
hood-by-the-numbers/index.html [https://perma.cc/TC5S-QL3F] (stating that no federal 
funds are used for abortions at Planned Parenthood and that only 3% of the services Planned 
Parenthood provides are abortions).  
 53 See Jeanne Pinder, Men, Women, and Health Care Pricing Theory: Speaking 
Different Languages, HEALTH CARE BLOG (June 9, 2016), http://thehealthcareblog.com/ 
blog/2016/06/09/men-women-and-health-care-pricing-theory-speaking-different-
languages/[https://perma.cc/E3PB-AYUZ].  
 54 See Judith Solomon, House Bill on Medicaid Providers Would Limit Beneficiaries’ 
Access to Care, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES (Sept. 29, 2015),  
https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/house-bill-on-medicaid-providers-would-limit-
beneficiaries-access-to-care [https://perma.cc/D63G-YR6J].  
 55 See supra Part II and accompanying text. 
 56 M.B v. Corsi, No. 2:17-cv-04102-NKL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3232, at *44–52 
(W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2018). 
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which Congress does not include express language of an enforceable federal 
right, a potential chilling effect on otherwise cognizable claims.  
If Does v. Gillespie stands, it serves as a threat to potential plaintiffs’ ability 
to sue under the Medicaid Act and other similar statutes. Particularly, this 
decision has a disproportionate impact on individuals attempting to use 
Medicaid funding for reproductive health services. Without Medicaid funding, 
those services could be too costly for many Americans.  
B. Political Influences 
Although Planned Parenthood is frequently associated with abortions,57 
federal funds, including Medicaid funds, are currently not permitted to be used 
for abortion services.58 However, Arkansas and Oklahoma have successfully 
blocked patients from using Medicaid funding for non-abortion reproductive 
health services at Planned Parenthood.59 Other state legislatures may follow 
suit, particularly within federal jurisdictions where courts have not yet fully 
clarified the rights of beneficiaries under Medicaid’s free choice of provider 
provision.  
If other states deny Medicaid funding to Planned Parenthood patients, this 
could result in states withholding the funding as a political vehicle to decrease 
the number of abortions performed.60 Given that abortion is among the most 
divisive political issues in the U.S., legislators could defend Does v. Gillespie 
                                                                                                                     
 57 Planned Parenthood states that only 3% of all of its services are abortion-related, 
although multiple sources have come to the conclusion that this statistic is misleading. See 
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, For Planned Parenthood Abortion Stats, ‘3 Percent’ and ‘94 Percent’ 
Are Both Misleading, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/fact-checker/wp/2015/08/12/for-planned-parenthood-abortion-stats-3-percent-and-94-
percent-are-both-misleading/?utm_term=.ad4bc12a0d2f [https://perma.cc/5KTA-FP6D]; 
Logan Newman, How Much of Planned Parenthood’s Services Are Related to Abortions?, 
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, (July 14, 2017), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/fact-check 
/2017/07/14/fact-check-planned-parenthood-abortion-services/448575001/ 
[https://perma.cc/RZ6A-MLMX]; Danielle Kurtzleben, Fact Check: How Does Planned 
Parenthood Spend That Government Money?, NPR (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.npr.org/ 
sections/itsallpolitics/2015/08/05/429641062/fact-check-how-does-planned-parenthood-
spend-that-government-money [https://perma.cc/582L-TW65].  
 58 See Lewis Morris, Get the Facts Straight – There Is No Federal Funding of 
Abortions, THE HILL (July 10, 2017), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/healthcare/34132 
4-get-the-facts-straight-there-is-no-federal-funding-of-abortions [https://perma.cc/6VRC-
74CH] (“[S]ince the passage of the Hyde Amendment in 1976, there is no federal Medicaid 
funding of abortion, except in three narrowly defined situations: if continuing the pregnancy 
would endanger the life of the woman, or the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.”). 
 59 See Lena H. Sun, Obama Officials Warn States About Cutting Medicaid Funds to 
Planned Parenthood, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/post-nation/wp/2016/04/19/obama-officials-warn-states-about-cutting-medicaid-funds-to-
planned-parenthood/?utm_term=.36de451c6f18 [https://perma.cc/6DQL-SY8N]. 
 60 See Solomon, supra note 54. 
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as a way to rally support among pro-life constituencies or to promote a federalist 
agenda.61  
Indeed, even within the context of cases with similar Medicaid funding 
issues, government officials from different states than the one(s) being sued 
readily expressed their opinion publicly regarding the relevant issues.62 For 
example, in a Fifth Circuit case, officials of the State of Arkansas filed an amicus 
curie brief to voice support for the state withholding Medicaid funding from 
Planned Parenthood and explain its position that Medicaid beneficiaries should 
not have an actionable right under Section 1983, even though a decision in the 
Fifth Circuit would not be binding on Arkansas.63  
Finally, one may fairly wonder if the social and political atmosphere around 
Planned Parenthood influenced the Eighth Circuit. In 2015, a video surfaced 
which purported to show Planned Parenthood employees in Arkansas selling 
fetal tissue.64 Arkansas terminated the state’s Medicaid provider agreements 
with local Planned Parenthood locations, giving rise to Does v. Gillespie.65 Even 
though this video was later found to be falsified and inaccurate,66 Arkansas did 
not change its position on Medicaid funding being used for Planned Parenthood. 
Does v. Gillespie seems to validate Arkansas’ political decision to deny Planned 
Parenthood as a choice for its Medicaid beneficiaries, even though its basis for 
doing so was seemingly grounded on false allegations.  
Does v. Gillespie may expand state deference in choosing where its 
Medicaid funds may or may not be spent, possibly at the direct expense of 
Medicaid beneficiaries. Other states may follow Arkansas’ lead and preclude 
Medicaid beneficiaries from using funds at local Planned Parenthood locations. 
This would be a particularly troubling result, leaving some women seeking non-
abortion health services in some states in a disadvantageous position compared 
to their counterparts in other states.  
V. MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES SHOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO SUE A STATE 
THAT VIOLATES THE FREE CHOICE OF PROVIDER PROVISION 
Although the Medicaid Act does not explicitly provide a cause of action for 
individual beneficiaries, it should be read in a way that creates a judicially 
                                                                                                                     
 61 Margot Cleveland, Arkansas Decision Puts Urgency on GOP Promises to Cut 
Planned Parenthood Funding, THE FEDERALIST (Aug. 22, 2017), http://thefederalist.com/ 
2017/08/22/arkansas-decision-puts-urgency-gop-promises-cut-planned-parenthood-
funding/ [https://perma.cc/SNF3-HVZW].  
 62 See generally Brief of the States of Arkansas et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Defendants, Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Family Planning & Preventative Health 
Servs., Inc. v. Smith, 236 F. Supp. 3d 974 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (No. 17-50282). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See generally Kurtzleben, supra note 27. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Jackie Calmes, Planned Parenthood Videos Were Altered, Analysis Finds, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/us/abortion-planned- 
parenthood-videos.html [https://perma.cc/RT33-4H2G].  
146 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 80:1 
enforceable right for Medicaid beneficiaries when a state does not provide 
funding to a qualified provider.67 If a provider is qualified, a state should not be 
allowed to deny funding for any reason.68 And if a state does deny such funding, 
beneficiaries should be able to bring the state to court.69  
The fact that each state individually defines which entities are “qualified 
providers” within the Medicaid Act’s free choice of provider provision adds an 
extra layer of ambiguity. Each state may have different provider qualifications, 
resulting in the possibility of Medicaid beneficiaries being treated differently 
compared to those in other states. However, this Note does not suggest that 
states should not have any discretion in determining which health care providers 
are qualified within the meaning of the Medicaid Act– to suggest otherwise 
would almost certainly be unconstitutional and contrary to the legislative intent 
behind the Act.70  
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in two cases, one in the Fifth 
Circuit71 and one in the Tenth72, effectively affirming a Medicaid beneficiary’s 
private right of action to challenge a state’s denial of Medicaid funding in states 
                                                                                                                     
 67 But see Marc Andrew Ison, Two Wrongs Don’t Make a Right: Medicaid, Section 
1983 and the Cost of an Enforceable Right to Health Care, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1479, 1508–
09 (2003) (“The Medicaid Act lacks the language necessary to create an enforceable private 
right. Since section 1983 ‘merely provides a mechanism for enforcing individual rights 
‘secured’ elsewhere’ by the Constitution and laws of the United States, the [Supreme] Court 
[of the United States] should not allow a section 1983 claim unless Congress, in the statute 
at issue, has spoken with a clear voice manifesting an ‘unambiguous intent to confer 
individual rights.’”). 
 68 See Caitlin Owens, States Can’t End Medicaid Funding of Planned Parenthood, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/states-
cant-end-medicaid-funding-of-planned-parenthood/452283/[https://perma.cc/W3Q3-
HA72] (quoting Cindy Mann, former director of Centers for Medicaid and Medicare 
Services (CMS)) (“Medicaid programs may not exclude qualified health care 
providers . . . from providing services under the program because they separately provide 
abortion services (not funded by federal Medicaid dollars, consistent with the federal 
prohibition) as part of their scope of practice.”). 
 69 See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus 
Curiae at 4–5, Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 565 U.S. 606 (2012) (Nos. 09-958, -
1158, 10-283) (arguing that Medicaid beneficiaries should have a broad right to sue in the 
context of states violating the Act’s reimbursement rate provision). But see Douglas v. Indep. 
Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 565 U.S. 606, 616 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that 
Congress did not intend to create a private right of action when it passed Medicare). 
 70 See Ison, supra note 67, at 1515 (“A Medicaid system without enforceable private 
rights would more closely resemble the program envisioned by its authors, who wished to 
enable ‘each State, as far as practicable under the conditions in each State, to furnish [medical 
services to the poor].’”). 
 71 Gee v. Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 408 (2018). 
 72 Anderson v. Planned Parenthood of Kan. & Mid-Missouri, No. 17-1340, 2018 
LEXIS 7205 (S.C. Dec. 10, 2018). 
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within these circuits.73 Supporters of Planned Parenthood, including its 
President Dr. Leana Wen, consider this a victory, ensuring that states within the 
Fifth and Tenth districts cannot limit Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to Planned 
Parenthood services.74 However, as Justice Thomas emphasized in his dissent 
to the Court’s denial of certiorari, the Court’s failure to opine on this issue 
results in women in different states having different rights under the same 
federal statute.75 If the Court has the opportunity to grant certiorari with respect 
to the Gillespie case, it should do so to resolve this inconsistency.  
There must be a balance in which the states can regulate providers, while at 
the same time ensuring that Medicaid beneficiaries do not have differing levels 
of federal protections. In other words, if Gillespie stands, Medicaid beneficiaries 
in states within the Eighth Circuit that wish to use their federal Medicaid funds 
for reproductive health services at Planned Parenthood seem to be at a 
tremendous disadvantage compared to beneficiaries who live in states under the 
jurisdiction of the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. No matter which 
state a beneficiary lives in, she should have the ability to challenge the state’s 
decision of whether Planned Parenthood is a qualified provider. A beneficiary 
who believes her state is arbitrarily discriminating against her because she is 
using Medicaid funds to defray her cost of reproductive health expenses should 
be able to challenge that alleged discrimination. 
Without a private right of action for beneficiaries, Medicaid funding 
disbursements would have a disproportionately negative impact on female 
beneficiaries in states bound by Gillespie. Women spend much more on 
reproductive health services and “represent the majority of Medicare 
beneficiaries.”76 More women are low-income earners than men;77 a lack of 
adequate Medicaid funding for women’s health issues would certainly be 
contradictory to Medicaid’s core purposes.78  
Issues that are specific to reproductive health further exacerbate this 
disparity of health care availability to women. Although certain procedures, 
                                                                                                                     
 73 See Manny Marotta, Supreme Court will not Review Planned Parenthood Defunding 
Cases, JURIST (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.jurist.org/news/2018/12/supreme-court-will-
not-review-planned-parenthood-defunding-cases/[https://perma.cc/VSF4-J8HL]. 
 74 Id. (“We are pleased that lower court rulings protecting patients remain in place. 
Every person has a fundamental right to health care, no matter who they are, where they live, 
or how much they earn.”). 
 75 Gee, 139 S. Ct. at 409 (“Because of this Court’s inaction, patients in different States–
even patients with the same providers–have different rights to challenge their State’s 
provider decisions.”). 
 76 Gary M. Owens, MD, Gender Differences in Health Care Expenditures, Resource 
Utilization, and Quality of Care, 14 SUPPLEMENT TO J. OF MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 2 
(2008).  
 77 See Jasmine Tucker & Caitlin Lowell, National Snapshot: Poverty Among Women & 
Families, 2015, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Sept. 14, 2016), https://nwlc.org/resources/ 
national-snapshot-poverty-among-women-families-2015/ [https://perma.cc/N2XU-MFY2] 
(reporting that women in 2015 were 35% more likely to live in poverty than men).  
 78 See Pinder, supra note 53.  
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such as abortions, are more cost-effective and safer than they ever have been, 
many women still fall victim to unsafe abortions.79 Allowing a state to deny 
Medicaid funding to providers that offer American women safe, effective, and 
regulated care would further require women, particularly those with lower 
incomes, to seek other potentially unsafe and illegal options.  
Federal courts that have not yet decided the issue should decline to follow 
the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Does v. Gillespie and instead read the Medicaid 
Act to include a federal right that is judicially enforceable under Section 1983. 
This would allow beneficiaries to sue when a state violates the Medicaid Act’s 
free choice of provider provision. This would also fulfill Congress’ intent to 
protect all Medicaid beneficiaries, regardless of the type of health care they 
seek. Such an approach would not automatically revoke a state’s discretion in 
determining which providers are qualified within the meaning of the statute. 
Instead, it would prevent states from doing so in a way that discriminates against 
Medicaid beneficiaries who are seeking health services from providers that may 
be more politically sensitive than others.  
A. The Test for a Judicially Enforceable Right Under Section 1983 
The Supreme Court of the United States has noted that Section 1983 does 
not provide an avenue for relief every time a state actor violates a federal law, 
but rather provides individuals with an enforceable federal right only for certain 
statutes.80 Although the Supreme Court has not considered whether the 
Medicaid Act’s free choice of provider provision gives rise to a private cause of 
action for Medicaid beneficiaries, it has had the opportunity to discuss whether 
Section 1983 creates a judicially enforceable right for private citizens in the 
context of other laws similar to the free choice of provider provision.81 These 
                                                                                                                     
 79 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WOMEN AND HEALTH: TODAY’S EVIDENCE 
TOMORROW’S AGENDA 47 (2009).  
 80 See City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 126–27 (2005) (holding 
that an individual may not enforce the Federal Telecommunications Act’s limitations with 
regard to injunctive relief against a local zoning authority through a Section 1983 action). 
 81 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002) (applying the Wilder and Blessing 
framework and holding that the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) did not 
create judicially-enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 
329, 341–49 (1997) (creating a three-part test to determine whether a statute conveys a 
judicially enforceable right under Section 1983 and determining that Title IV-D of the Social 
Security Act does not under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 
524 (1990) (holding that the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act does create judicially-
enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Sean Jessee, Fulfilling the Promise of 
the Medicaid Act: Why the Equal Access Clause Creates Privately Enforceable Rights, 58 
EMORY L.J. 791, 801 (2009) (“While the Supreme Court has not yet ruled whether a 
Medicaid recipient has an individualized federal right under the equal access clause to bring 
a § 1983 lawsuit, a significant number of judicial opinions relevant to this inquiry exist.”). 
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cases, however, have raised as many questions as they have answers.82 Wilder 
v. Virginia Hospital Association and Blessing v. Freestone outline the tests the 
Supreme Court has used in the past to address early issues of whether certain 
statutes provide individuals with judicially enforceable rights.83 Gonzaga 
University v. Doe is especially important, as it is the most recent case in which 
the Court decided a substantive Section 1983 issue with respect to a federal 
statute,84 and the majority’s opinion there heavily influenced the Eighth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Gillespie.85 
1. Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association 
At issue in Wilder was the Boren Amendment, a provision of the Medicaid 
Act that requires a state’s Medicaid program to provide “reasonable 
access . . . to inpatient hospital services of adequate quality” for the mentally 
retarded.86 In Wilder, the Court determined that the language of the Boren 
Amendment to the Medicaid Act created an enforceable right, but that this right 
was not enforceable under Section 1983 because the statute does not include 
judicial intervention as a remedy.87 The Court considered the language of the 
1980 Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act and concluded that it requires 
states to reimburse providers in its Medicaid program at rates that “the State 
finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and 
adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and 
economically operated facilities.”88 Congress did not define “reasonable and 
adequate” behavior in the Boren Amendment, nor did the office of the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services promulgate regulatory guidance; ultimately the 
interpretation of “reasonable and adequate” is left to the states.89 The Boren 
Amendment mirrors the free choice of provider provision in the sense that 
                                                                                                                     
 82 See Jessee, supra note 81, at 792 (“The judicial split, and the confusion evident in 
the wide variety of reasoning used to apply the Supreme Court’s test for whether a statute is 
enforceable through § 1983, suggests that the Supreme Court should directly address the 
enforceability [of a statute through Section 1983].”). 
 83 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 498; Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340–41.  
 84 Jane Perkins, Private Enforcement of the Medicaid Act Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.healthlaw.org/issues/medicaid/ 
private-enforcement-of-the-medicaid-act-pursuant-to-42-usc-1983#.Wl0MIZM-eqA 
[https://perma.cc/Q4CD-8WD3]. 
 85 See Does, 867 F.3d at 1039 (citing Gonzaga, 586 U.S. at 283) (“To support an action 
under § 1983, a plaintiff relying on a federal law must establish that Congress clearly 
intended to create an enforceable federal right.”). 
 86 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 503 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A)). 
 87 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 501–02, 523 (“We also reject petitioners’ argument that the 
existence of administrative procedures whereby health care providers can obtain review of 
individual claims for payment evidences an intent to foreclose a private remedy in the federal 
courts.”). 
 88 Id. at 503. 
 89 Ison, supra note 67, at 1499.  
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neither Congress nor the Secretary of Health have defined what a “qualified 
provider” is, leaving states with broad discretion to define the phrase for 
themselves.90  
In Wilder, the Court stated that Section 1983 provides a cause of action only 
for violations of “rights, privileges, or immunities” conferred by a federal 
statute; simply proving that a state violated a federal law is not enough to have 
a federal right.91 The Court created a three-part test to determine if the Boren 
Amendment offers a private right for Medicaid beneficiaries.92 First, the Court 
asked whether the Boren Amendment “was intended to benefit the putative 
plaintiff,” meaning individuals and entities providing medical services to the 
beneficiaries of Virginia’s Medicaid program.93 The Court concluded that, 
because the Amendment was “phrased in terms of benefiting health-care 
providers,” that it was intended to benefit providers, not beneficiaries.94 
The Court then considered whether the Amendment “impose[s] a ‘binding 
obligation on the States,” or if it merely suggests a “congressional preference 
for a certain kind of conduct.”95 Because the Boren Amendment states that a 
“State plan…must provide [reasonable and adequate] rates,” the Court held that 
this language spoke in “mandatory rather than precatory terms” which were 
“wholly uncharacteristic of a mere suggestion or ‘nudge.’”96 The Court also 
found that the Medicaid Act as a whole “conditioned a State’s receipt of federal 
funds on its compliance with the Amendment.”97 Therefore, because the 
Amendment imposed an obligation on states rather than an idea or wish from 
Congress of how they should act, the Court determined that the second step of 
its three-part test was satisfied and could support a private right of action under 
Section 1983.98 
The final step of the Court’s analysis considered whether the Amendment’s 
instructions to states were “too ‘vague and amorphous’ to be judicially 
enforceable.”99 Although the Court concluded that the language of the Boren 
                                                                                                                     
 90 See supra Part II. 
 91 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508–09. 
 92 Id.at 509–25. 
 93 Id. at 509.  
 94 Id. at 510.  
 95 Id. at 509–10. 
 96 Id. at 512 (emphasis omitted) (quoting W. Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 885 
F.2d 11 (CA3 1989) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 
(1981)).  
 97 Ison, supra note 67, at 1500. 
 98 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509–20. But see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 
U.S. 1, 28 (1981) (“[T]he typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed 
conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal 
Government to terminate funds to the State.”).  
 99 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519; see also DAVID W. LEE, HANDBOOK OF SECTION 1983 
LITIGATION § 1.01(C) (2017) (“[Section] 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal 
statutory law unless the remedial devices provided in the federal statute in question are 
sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of 
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Amendment created an enforceable right,100 it simultaneously noted that the 
Medicaid Act precludes private enforcement actions under Section 1983 
because, unlike the Boren Amendment, the Medicaid Act does not provide 
judicial proceedings as a remedial measure for noncompliant states.101  
What would happen if the Wilder analysis were applied to the free choice 
of provider provision of the Medicaid Act? First, the language of the provision 
begins with the phrase, “any individual eligible for medical assistance may 
obtain such assistance,”102 suggesting that it is intended to benefit beneficiaries, 
not providers.103 This makes sense, especially considering the legislative intent 
behind the Medicaid Act and the addition of the free choice of provider 
provision.104 Additionally, courts have determined previously that providers 
undoubtedly do not have a cause of action under the free choice of provider 
provision.105 This points more strongly to an inference of a private right of 
action for beneficiaries under the first step of the Wilder test regarding the 
inquiry of whether legislation is intended to benefit certain individuals.  
The second step of the test does not apply as neatly to the free choice of 
provider provision. There is no “mandatory” language within the free choice of 
provider provision unequivocally stating that states must act a certain way. 
Rather, the provision states that beneficiaries may choose to use Medicaid 
funding towards any “qualified provider” of his or her choice.106 Unlike the 
Boren Amendment the Court analyzed in Wilder, the free choice of provider 
provision is phrased in terms of what individuals within each state are permitted 
to do within the confines of the Medicaid Act, rather than demanding that states 
act a certain way. But as a practical matter, if the provision allows beneficiaries 
discretion in where to use their Medicaid funds, this Note argues that it is 
mandatory for the states to allow beneficiaries to exercise this right. 
In applying the Wilder test to the free choice of provider provision, the third 
step of the analysis asks whether or not the language of the provision is too 
“vague” or “amorphous” to render it judicially unenforceable.107 The only 
phrase of the free choice of provider provision that lacks an explicit definition 
                                                                                                                     
suits under § 1983.” (citing City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S 113, 119–20 
(2005)).  
 100 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519–20. 
 101 Id. at 523; see also Ison, supra note 67, at 1502–03 (“This concern, coupled with the 
Court’s subsequent decision in Blessing v. Freestone, hinted that the sources of supposed 
private rights might be subjected to some heightened level of scrutiny in the future.”).  
 102 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(23)(2012) (emphasis added). 
 103 For an analysis of the language of the provision, see supra note 19 and accompanying 
text discussing the interpretation found in the Code of Federal Regulations. 
 104 See supra Part II.  
 105 See supra Part III.A. 
 106 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
 107 Wilder, 496 U.S. 512, 519 (1990). 
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from Congress is what it means for a provider to be “qualified.”108 Therefore, 
the free choice of provider provision should not be considered so vague or 
ambiguous as to preclude a judicially enforceable private right of action for 
Medicaid beneficiaries under the Wilder framework.  
Although the Wilder framework is the beginning of Section 1983 litigation 
in the civil context and is still considered good law, this test has been modified 
significantly by the Court’s reasoning in Gonzaga University v. Doe109 in 2002, 
changing the inquiry of whether a statute provides a beneficiary with an 
enforceable federal right. 
2. Gonzaga University v. Doe 
In Gonzaga University v. Doe, the Supreme Court held that the Family 
Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) does not confer a judicially 
enforceable right for its beneficiaries under Section 1983. This is because the 
statute was enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power and does not include 
language that creates a federal right.110 The Court recognized that its previous 
decisions determining whether individuals had a private right of action under 
Section 1983 within the context of certain statutes were not “models of clarity” 
and strove to “resolve any ambiguity.”111 
The Court noted that, because FERPA was enacted pursuant to Congress’ 
spending power, “the typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally 
imposed conditions is not a private cause of action . . . but rather action by the 
Federal Government to terminate funds to the State.”112 This is one way that the 
Court narrowed the previous standard for determining whether there is a private 
right of action under Section 1983, which it interpreted as a “relatively loose 
standard for finding rights enforceable.”113 The Court concluded that FERPA 
did not create a judicially enforceable right under Section 1983 because of the 
statute’s enforcement mechanism, “direct[ing] the Secretary of Education to 
deal with violations by creating a review board for investigating and 
adjudicating violations of the statute.”114  
Although the statute allows aggrieved parents or students an opportunity to 
file complaints with administrative officials, these complaints do not provide an 
individual remedy through Section 1983.115 Instead, the statute has a different 
                                                                                                                     
 108 See supra Part II (a qualified provider is “any institution, agency, community 
pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service or services required . . . who 
undertakes to provide [a beneficiary] such services”). 
 109 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). 
 110 Id. at 279. 
 111 Id. at 278.  
 112 Id. at 280 (quoting Halderman, 451 U.S. at 28). 
 113 Id. at 282.  
 114 Ison, supra note 67, at 1507 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(f)-(g) (2000)).  
 115 See 34 C.F.R. § 99.63 (2002); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 278–79, 287–90 
(2002). While the complaint may eventually force the violating institution to comply with 
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remedy in place: the Secretary is able to send an institution instructions on how 
it may correct its violation.116 Therefore, the Court has come to the conclusion 
that if the “remedial devices provided in a federal statute in question are 
sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the 
remedy of suits under § 1983,”117 an individual does not have a federal cause of 
action under Section 1983. 
In addressing the applicable standard, the Court emphasized that the most 
important question to answer is whether Congress has spoken “with a clear 
voice” to demonstrate “unambiguous intent to confer individual rights” under 
Section 1983.118 In other words, “a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal 
right, not merely a violation of federal law.”119 The Court went on to say that 
“[t]he question whether Congress . . . intended to create a private right of action 
[is] definitively answered in the negative” where “a statute by its terms grants 
no private rights to any identifiable class.”120 Specifically, a statute creates a 
private right of action for individuals if it is “phrased in terms of the persons 
benefitted.”121 With this reasoning, the Court attempted to clarify the first prong 
of the three-part test it outlined in Blessing v. Freestone: whether Congress 
enacted a certain provision with the intention to benefit someone in the 
plaintiff’s situation.122 
To provide examples of statutes drafted with “rights creating” language, the 
Court offered Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the 
Education Act Amendments.123 The Court determined that FERPA lacked this 
language because it served as a “directive to the Secretary of Education, not a 
statement creating a private right.”124 Additionally, the Court found that FERPA 
                                                                                                                     
FERPA’s privacy requirements or forego federal funding, the complaining student receives 
neither a curative remedy nor damages as compensation for the release of his academic 
information. Id. at 289–91. 
 116 See 34 C.F.R. § 99.66(b), (c)(1). 
 117 LEE, supra note 99, § 1.01(C). 
 118 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280.  
 119 Id. at 282 (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340). 
 120 Id. at 283–84 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979)). 
 121 Id. at 284 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 692 n.13 (1979)). 
 122 Id. at 283. The Blessing Court determined that a statute confers a federal right if (1) 
Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff, (2) the 
plaintiff demonstrates that the right asserted is not so vague and ambiguous “that its 
enforcement would strain judicial competence,” and (3) if the statute unambiguously 
“imposes a binding obligation on the States,” in mandatory rather than precatory terms. 
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340–41.  
 123 See Jessee, supra note 81, at 800 n.71 (“Title VI provides that ‘[n]o person in the 
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be . . . subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal assistance.’ 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d (2006). Title IX provides that ‘[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of 
sex . . . be subjected to discrimination . . .’ 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (2006).”).  
 124 Ison, supra note 67, at 1506. The text of FERPA states “[n]o funds shall be made 
available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution . . . which 
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did not create an enforceable federal right for individuals because it is not 
concerned with “whether the needs of a particular person have been 
satisfied.”125 Furthermore, the Court found that FERPA’s provisions speak 
“only in terms of institutional policy and practice, not individual instances of 
disclosure,”126 giving the statute an aggregate focus.  
 There are a few differences between FERPA and the Medicaid Act’s free 
choice of provider provision that imply the free choice of provider provision 
could confer an enforceable federal right under the Gonzaga reasoning. 
Although the Medicaid Act allows the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
to reduce or cut off funding from states that do not comply with the program’s 
requirements, an enforceable federal right is still available under Section 1983 
where Congress has not established a “carefully crafted and intricate remedial 
scheme . . . for the enforcement of a particular federal right.”127 The Medicaid 
Act simply allows the Secretary to reduce or cut off funds if a state’s program 
does not meet federal requirements.128 It does not empower the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services to create a review board and engage in an 
investigative process like the remedial scheme under FERPA.129 Therefore, the 
Medicaid Act lacks the detailed remedial scheme necessary to preempt the 
existence of an enforceable federal right under Section 1983.  
The next issue under Gonzaga is whether the Medicaid Act and its free 
choice of provider provision grant rights to an identifiable class. Following the 
Gonzaga reasoning, the Medicaid Act’s language can be said to grant rights to 
an identifiable class if it is “phrased in terms of the persons benefitted.”130 One 
argument is that the Medicaid Act is not phrased in terms of the persons 
benefitted because “its provisions speak ‘only in terms of institutional policy 
and practice’ and not in terms of the provision of care to any individual.”131 Put 
another way, “the focus of the Secretary’s inquiry is on the plan or the 
administration of the plan, not on individual instances of noncompliance.”132 
The language of the Medicaid Act’s free choice of provider provision is 
permissive with the word “may,”133 in contrast with the mandatory language of 
the statutes the Court provided as examples of rights-creating language in 
                                                                                                                     
effectively prevents . . . the right to inspect and review . . . education records.” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g(a)(1)(A).  
 125 Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288. 
 126 Id.  
 127 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73–74 (1996) (finding no enforceable 
right under Section 1983 for a statute that included remedial measures such as timetables, 
incentives, and “intricate procedures” to cajole Indian tribes to negotiate agreements on 
gambling). 
 128 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c. 
 129 See supra note 108. 
 130 Ison, supra note 67, at 1499 (citing to Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 510 
(1990)). 
 131 Ison, supra note 67, at 1510 (citing Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 288).  
 132 Id.  
 133 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c. 
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Gonzaga.134 However, the freedom of choice provision is still phrased in terms 
of the group of people it is intended to benefit: Medicaid beneficiaries. The text 
of FERPA that the Court interpreted in Gonzaga did not mention any individuals 
or groups of people, but rather stated that “[n]o funds shall be made available 
under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution.”135 In 
contrast, the free choice of provider provision in particular states that “any 
individual eligible for medical assistance (including drugs) may obtain such 
assistance from any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, 
qualified to perform the service or services required.”136 Because the free choice 
of provider provision is phrased in terms of “any individual” that receives 
Medicaid funding,137 it arguably would pass the Gonzaga standard and confer a 
judicially enforceable right upon Medicaid beneficiaries.  
Medicaid Act’s free choice of provider provision lacks a detailed remedial 
scheme and is phrased in terms of the individuals it is intended to benefit. 
Therefore, it should be distinguishable from FERPA and said to authorize an 
enforceable federal right under Section 1983.  
B. The Medicaid Act’s Free Choice of Provider Provision Should Be 
Enforceable Under Section 1983 
If the free choice of provider provision is not interpreted to meet the 
standards outlined by the Supreme Court in Wilder and Gonzaga, then did the 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits all got it wrong?138 Or is there another 
possibility specific to statutes like the Medicaid Act that allow individuals to 
sue a state when they are denied certain benefits provided under the statute?  
Just one month before the Supreme Court decided Gonzaga v. Doe, the 
Sixth Circuit applied the Blessing test to a provision of the Medicaid Act and 
determined that it does confer an enforceable federal right on Medicaid 
beneficiaries.139 In Westside Mothers v. Haveman, the Sixth Circuit analyzed 
the language of the Medicaid Act, particularly its mandate for states to provide 
“early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services . . . for 
individuals who are eligible under the plan.”140 The Sixth Circuit determined 
that this particular provision was “intended to benefit the putative plaintiffs, 
children who are eligible for the screening and treatment services” because the 
Court “found no appellate cases to the contrary.”141 This is significant because 
                                                                                                                     
 134 Gonzaga, 537 U.S. at 284. 
 135 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A). 
 136 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(23). 
 137 Id. 
 138 For an overview of the reasoning of the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in 
deciding this issue, see supra Part III.B.  
 139 Westside Mothers v. Havemen, 289 F.3d 852, 863 (6th Cir. 2002), cert denied, 537 
U.S. 1045. For an outline of the Blessing test, see supra note 122.  
 140 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(B).  
 141 Westside Mothers, 298 F.3d at 863 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)).  
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it suggests that the inquiry of whether an individual has a right to sue under 
Section 1983 depends not on the statutory scheme, but rather seems to favor 
reading a specific provision of a statute in a way that does confer a federal right, 
unless court precedent says otherwise.142  
The Sixth Circuit also found that the provisions of the Medicaid Act set a 
“binding obligation” on states because “[t]hey are couched in mandatory rather 
than precatory language, stating that Medicaid services ‘shall be furnished’ [to 
eligible individuals],” and that treatment “must be provided.”143 Finally, the 
court determined “the provisions are not so vague and amorphous as to defeat 
judicial enforcement, as the statute and regulations carefully detail the specific 
services to be provided.”144 Perhaps the most important language from the Court 
is its statement that “Congress did not explicitly foreclose recourse to § 1983 in 
this instance, nor has it established any remedial scheme sufficiently 
comprehensive to supplant § 1983” in the context of the Medicaid Act.145 
The reasoning in Westside Mothers is significant because the Sixth Circuit 
showed a willingness to treat discrete portions of the Act differently. This is 
different compared to the Wilder, Gonzaga, and Blessing cases that apply the 
same reasoning to each provision within the act in question, a holistic approach 
that can overlook key textual discrepancies within a given statutory scheme. In 
Wilder, Gonzaga, and Blessing, the courts read entire acts as barring individual 
claims, regardless of whether a specific provision suggested otherwise.146  
Although Westside Mothers addresses only the screening and treatment 
provisions of the Medicaid Act and determines that it gives rise to a cause of 
action under Section 1983,147 the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning is applicable to the 
free choice of provider provision as well. There is little doubt that the free choice 
of provider provision is intended to benefit Medicaid beneficiaries as a group of 
individuals. If this is not a specific enough class to entitle beneficiaries to sue 
under Section 1983, this Note argues that the free choice of provider provision 
should be read to benefit Medicaid beneficiaries who wish to use Medicaid 
funding for all non-abortion reproductive health services. This is a logical 
reading of the provision, given that many of the decisions states make in denying 
the ability to use Medicaid funding is within the context of family planning and 
reproductive health services.148 If the Westside Mothers reasoning is applied to 
                                                                                                                     
 142 See id. (citing Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341) (“If these conditions [of the Blessing test] 
are met, we presume the statute creates an enforceable right unless Congress has explicitly 
or implicitly foreclosed this.”). 
 143 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)). 
 144 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)). 
 145 Id.  
 146 See supra Part V.A.1 and Part V.A.2.  
 147 Westside Mothers, 298 F.3d at 863 (“Plaintiffs have a cause of action under § 1983 
for alleged noncompliance with the screening and treatment provision of the Medicaid 
Act.”).  
 148 This reading of the free choice of provider provision is consistent with the legislative 
history behind its addition to the Medicaid Act and Congress’ intent to provide Medicaid 
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the free choice of provider provision in future cases, a plaintiff is likely to have 
a cause of action under Section 1983 because the provision can be read to benefit 
a specific group of individuals, and no other remedial scheme or relief is 
available. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Since Congress passed the Medicaid Act, the United States’ healthcare 
system has remained highly politicized, with elected officials unable to agree on 
how large of a role the federal government should have in providing coverage 
to low-income and elderly Americans. While the addition of the freedom of 
choice provision to the Medicaid Act seems to allow a beneficiary to have access 
to any qualified provider of her choosing, in practical terms is unclear whether 
this choice is a fundamental right that beneficiaries may enforce and protect 
through a Section 1983 action.  
With the addition of the free choice of provider provision, Congress 
intended to allow states a significant amount of deference in determining which 
health care providers meet the meaning of “qualified.” Therefore, the provision 
allows states to decide which providers are available to Medicaid beneficiaries 
wishing to use federal and state funds to finance health care services. More 
specifically, the legislative history of the Medicaid Act’s free choice of provider 
provision indicates that Congress wished to prevent states from barring 
Medicaid beneficiaries from private health care facilities. There is also evidence 
that Congress wished to deter states from imposing moral judgments on 
Americans’ choices regarding family planning with the provision’s enactment.  
Since the passage of the freedom of choice provision, courts have struggled 
with the notion of whether it awards Medicaid beneficiaries the right to sue a 
state for denying access to a certain provider. While most federal circuits have 
concluded that Medicaid beneficiaries do have the right to bring Section 1983 
claims,149 the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Does v. Gillespie casts doubt onto 
whether plaintiffs in this situation do have an enforceable right.150  
The free choice of provider provision should be interpreted to provide 
Medicaid beneficiaries with an enforceable federal right and a cause of action 
under Section 1983 to challenge a state’s determination of which health care 
providers are “qualified.” Since providers are not given any rights under the 
provision, if beneficiaries are unable challenge state action, then no one can. 
This cannot be the intended result of the provision, given that Congress added 
it to the original Medicaid Act to prevent states from limiting access to certain 
providers. Therefore, courts should decline to adopt the Does v. Gillespie 
reasoning and instead decide in future cases that Medicaid beneficiaries have 
                                                                                                                     
beneficiaries with more freedom in family planning decisions. See supra note 17 and 
accompanying text.  
 149 See supra Part III.B. 
 150 See Does, 867 F.3d at 1046. 
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the right to challenge a state’s determination of whether a provider is qualified 
through a Section 1983 action. 
